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maintain a basic income for a limited period of time for laid-off workers
who are seeking reemployment. The system assumes that layoffs will be
temporary and most workers will be called back to their jobs. However,
deepening recessions, technological change, corporate downsizings, and
plant and company closures have resulted in greater permanent displace-
ment of workers. The unemployment insurance system is ill equipped to
assist long-term unemployed workers in the postindustrial economy. In
this Public Policy Brief, Oren M. Levin-Waldman, resident scholar of the
Levy Institute, proposes that the unemployment insurance system should
be improved to reduce the incidence of layoffs and to help the long-term
unemployed become marketable again.
Both the average duration of unemployment and the long-term unem-
ployed as a share of the total unemployed population have increased over
time. Using the Current Population Surv e y ’s 1993 annual demographic
file, Levin-Waldman finds that 20 percent of the unemployed population
w e re unemployed for 27 weeks or more (the long-term unemployed).
During the postwar period the long-term unemployed as a percentage of
the total unemployed peaked during recessions, but rarely re t u rned to pre-
recession levels, indicating that the current problem is not only cyclical,
but structural and gro w i n g .
A c c o rding to the most recent survey of displaced workers by the Bure a u
of Labor Statistics, about half of full-time workers who lost their job
between 1991 and 1993 were reemployed in a full-time job by Febru a ry
1994 at earnings equal to or greater than their earnings at their last job.
H o w e v e r, workers in the transportation, public utilities, construction, and
manufacturing sectors were more likely to find a new job at substantially
lower wages. Their new compensation was likely to be no more than 80
p e rcent of the compensation at their previous job. Others found only
p a rt-time employment, remained unemployed, or dropped out of the
labor force altogether.
L e v i n - Waldman notes that if a considerable pro p o rtion of displaced
workers work at reduced wages or as contingent workers, the system is
not helping them find the appropriate match. The system could do more
to help unemployed workers find reemployment that matches skills they
have with skills required by employers or to help them obtain the skills
S u m m a ry
PPB No.26  2/17/99  4:27 PM  Page 3n e c e s s a ry for a type of employment that will enable them to maintain
the standard of living they had during their prior employment. 
Unemployment insurance benefits are financed by a payroll tax paid by
employers. Levin-Waldman recommends an experience-rated pre m i u m
that better reflects a firm’s history of layoffs or the layoff patterns within
its industry. 
Levin-Waldman argues that what is needed is a two-tiered system that
distinguishes between short - t e rm and long-term unemployment. The
system should continue to function as an insurance program for 26 weeks
to allow workers to search for employment that re p resents the best
match with their experience, skills, and credentials. The first tier of the
i m p roved system would include re f o rms, such as altering the employer
taxes that finance UI and instituting work-sharing arrangements, to
reduce short - t e rm unemployment by reducing the incidence of layoff s .
The objective is to maintain employment levels during periods of eco-
nomic decline.
The second tier would include programs (such as employer-based job
training) to help the long-term unemployed develop skills that would
make them more marketable. Levin-Waldman’s reformed system would
make unemployment insurance benefits beyond 26 weeks contingent
upon the worker’s enrolling in a training program. The system would
employ the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Service System cur-
rently used to identify unemployed workers early in their unemployment
who are likely to become long-term unemployed. On the basis of their
p rofiles, workers would be directed to services such as re e m p l o y m e n t
assessment and workshops on writing resumes and interviewing. Workers
who are re f e rred to these services would be re q u i red to participate to
receive any unemployment insurance benefits.
L e v i n - Waldman concludes that the goal of re f o rm is not “merely to
achieve greater efficiency in facilitating reemployment, but to enhance a
core value of American Society: work.”
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$25 billion annually, providing partial replacement of income to 
2 million unemployed workers in an average week. The design and
s t ructural shortcomings of the UI system have been the subject of
debate. As described by Resident Scholar Oren M. Levin-Waldman,
UI was initially designed to be a temporary source of income for
workers laid off because of cylical or seasonal business changes. UI
was expected to tide workers over during their idle period, and they
were expected to return to their previous job when business condi-
tions improved. However, in the transition from a production-based
economy to an information-based economy, old jobs are often lost
forever, thereby reducing the efficacy of the current UI system and
rendering its initial design obsolete.
Recent initiatives to reform the UI system have been prompted by
two contrasting developments. First, a number of states have had
above-median economic growth coupled with relatively low levels of
unemployment over the past few years, swelling their UI trust fund
reserves. Some of these states, in their desire to foster a pro-business
climate and attract new firms, have indicated a willingness to return
the excess UI funds to employers in the form of refunds.
The second development, which is the focus of this Policy Brief, is the
rising number, independent of aggregate levels of unemployment, of
l o n g - t e rm unemployed. Many workers, as they move from job to job,
a re confronting the daunting task of “reengineering” or re i n v e n t i n g
their human capital endowments in an eff o rt to meet the demands of
7 The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
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the marketplace. Concurre n t l y, a growing sense of economic insecurity
among American workers, fueled by accelerating trends in techno-
logical change, globalization, and corporate downsizing, has led some
policymakers to embrace initiatives aimed at promoting job stability.
Although the academic literature on unemployment insurance typi-
cally focuses on its effects on workers, it also affects firms. This Policy
Brief is sensitive to the effects on both of these constituencies. Levin-
Waldman recognizes the need for a more perfect experience-rated
payroll tax on firms to finance the unemployment insurance system.
He offers a two-tiered approach for workers. First, he aims to reduce
the incidence of short - t e rm layoffs by recommending work-sharing
a g reements; second, he attempts to make unemployment insurance
m o re effective in the rapidly changing economy by pre s c r i b i n g
m a n d a t o ry training for the rising number of long-term unemployed
workers.
T h e re are no quick-fix solutions or panaceas to ease the range of
social costs associated with the scourge of unemployment. This Policy
Brief makes a significant contribution to the policy discourse by pro-
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The first line of defense for workers laid off from their jobs has been
the unemployment insurance (UI) system. The UI system was origi-
nally designed to partially replace the earnings of laid-off workers.
Unemployed workers usually qualify to receive benefits for a maxi-
mum of 26 weeks, if their unemployment is no fault of their own
and they can show that they have been looking for re e m p l o y m e n t .
The UI system’s design was based on the assumption that layoff s
would be temporary and that in most cases workers would be
recalled by their employers or would find comparable jobs. Over the
years deepening recessions, downsizing, plant closures, and the
changing stru c t u re of the labor market have resulted in longer spells
of unemployment, a growing number of people who apply for
extended benefits, and more permanent displacement. A system
designed to provide temporary assistance to tide workers over until
they are recalled is ill equipped to assist workers in their transition
to reemployment. This Policy Brief a rgues that the UI system must
be redesigned so that it can meet the needs of workers in an econ-
omy in transition—from industrial to postindustrial and from pro-
duction to inform a t i o n .
At a minimum the system needs to be tightened in such a way that it
reduces the incidence of layoffs. It could be redesigned to assist dis-
placed workers in obtaining reemployment early in their unemploy-
ment and to offer greater assistance to the growing population of the
long-term unemployed—those who have been permanently displaced
from their jobs because of plant or company closure, corporate down-
sizing, or changing technologies. 
R e f o rming Unemployment
Insurance: To w a rd Gre a t e r
E m p l o y m e n t
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(workers unemployed for more than 26 weeks) has grown more
rapidly than the short - t e rm unemployed population. These people
a re part of a growing class of chronically unemployed for whom a
policy response is essential. The logic of UI rests on the premise that
individuals need to be aff o rded the opportunity to search for new
work and that, given that opport u n i t y, they will find a job that
matches their skills and experience. The rising population of long-
t e rm unemployed casts doubt on whether an appropriate match can
be found within the 26-week period. A policy response of simply
extending benefits is still based on the assumptions made in the past
about the short - t e rm nature of unemployment and the ease with
which job matches can be made. I believe that something other
than merely extending benefits needs to be done for the long-term
u n e m p l o y e d .
Is Unemployment Insurance a Labor Disincentive?
The unemployment insurance system is characterized most notably
by its income maintenance function. Each state establishes a tru s t
fund financed through premiums levied against employers. It off e r s
laid-off workers critical income protection during temporary spells of
joblessness. By protecting the incomes of jobless workers, UI sustains
ordinary spending habits and also has the effect of giving the econ-
omy a needed boost during times of recession (Burtless 1991). It is
distinguished from public relief in that it functions as an insurance
system. This distinction enables recipients to maintain their self-
respect as the system prevents them from sliding into destitution.
The system, by design, is supposed to contribute to reemployment or
at least to not enable workers to choose to abstain from work. By lim-
iting the amount and duraton of benefits and by requiring recipients
to look for a job and be available for work, it reduces the disincentive
for work (Blaustein et al. 1993).
Most state UI programs provide eligible unemployed workers with a
m o n e t a ry payment to replace a percentage of their previous wages.
Making Unemployment Insurance Work
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One justification for the payment of such benefits is that it allows
individuals to focus on searching for a new job (Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation 1995). However, much of the litera-
ture since the 1970s has contended that the existing UI system is a
source of moral hazard1—that it provides disincentives to return to
work and thus increases the number of people unemployed and the
duration of joblessness.
Feldstein (1978) has asserted that the current system of UI encour-
ages temporary layoffs (temporary layoffs account for 50 percent of all
unemployment spells), increases the duration of unemployment
spells, and may also induce more brief spells of unemployment. He
argues that employers are more willing to lay off workers when they
a re confident that workers will re t u rn when recalled. Similarly,
employees are more willing to be laid off when they are confident
that they will be recalled. Katz and Meyer (1990) found that employer
recall policies are primary determinants of the duration of unemploy-
ment spells of individuals with recall prospects and that the probabil-
ity of leaving unemployment and finding new jobs increases greatly
around the time that UI benefits lapse. Furthermore, Meyer (1990)
found that higher UI benefits reduce the probability of leaving
unemployment, and the probability of reemployment rises dramati-
cally just before benefits lapse. Solon (1984) suggests that the denial
of benefits to job quitters may reduce the frequency of quitting
because it could increase the expected cost of leaving employment.
Solon argues that if the denial of benefits does reduce quitting, it
would only underscore the voluntary aspect of quitters’ unemploy-
ment and strengthen the argument that such unemployment should
not be compensated.
Feldstein and Poterba (1984) explain the disincentive to search for
work or to leave unemployment in terms of workers’ re s e rv a t i o n
wage—the lowest wage that workers will be willing to accept. An
employee who loses a job may have difficulty finding a new job that
pays a comparable wage. UI benefits increase workers’ re s e rv a t i o n
wage: even modest benefits allow the unemployed to refuse to take a
job and to become or remain long-term unemployed. Among the
unemployed looking for a job, a lower cost of unemployment allows
the setting of a higher reservation wage.
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who have been closed out of a job may be in a state of denial.
During the early days of their unemployment, they do not re a l l y
believe that they are not going to re t u rn to their job. As time passes,
they become more fully aware of this re a l i t y. Burtless suggests that
“neither theory nor available empirical evidence permits us to pre-
dict unequivocally the net effect of unemployment insurance on
labor supply.” By providing insurance to workers, UI offers some-
thing of value to people who become employed, and it may thus
i n c rease the attractiveness of market work. By supplementing the
incomes of workers who become unemployed, it may slow the
p rocess of reemployment. But without better empirical evidence
than is currently available, it is impossible to predict which of these
two basic effects will predominate. UI may increase the amount of
economically productive job search. It may raise the average prod u c-
tivity of workers by improving the match between jobs and workers.
In situations where there are two job vacancies and two unemployed
workers, it can be economically productive to subsidize the workers
so that they sort themselves into the jobs that maximize their joint
output and earnings (Burtless 1990).
Assuming that there is a reservation wage for each individual, what
factors other than previous wage may contribute to it? There may be
other considerations, such as education and tenure in the labor force.
In the debate about whether UI is a disincentive to work, it is impor-
tant to recognize that unemployment does more than disrupt people’s
income. That kind of disruption can be eased through UI benefits.
But unemployment also disrupts the structure and fabric of workers’
lives, and UI benefits cannot compensate for that disruption no mat-
ter how generous the provision (Pappas 1989, Buss and Redburn
1983). Rather than emphasize the UI system’s distortive impact on
the behavior of the unemployed, policymakers should reconsider the
design of the system in term of the current realities of the labor mar-
ket. A focus on disincentives to work, associated frequently with
re s e rvation wages, diverts attention from the question of whether
there is a skills mismatch between workers who are laid off and jobs
that are available. To find the appropriate match may take some
time, and UI may offer some of the necessary time.
Making Unemployment Insurance Work
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L o n g - Te rm Unemployed
The unemployed population is by no means a homogeneous group. A
consistent profile of the general population of unemployed individu-
als can be constructed based on the Current Population Surv e y ’s
(CPS) 1993 annual demographic file. The CPS micro data contain
t h ree re c o rds: personal, family, and household. The personal re c o rd
sample consists of roughly 157,000 individuals, of whom 5,827 are
unemployed. The unemployed individuals are divided into two
g roups according to duration of unemployment. Short - t e rm unem-
ployment is defined as 1 to 26 weeks and long-term unemployment as
27 to 100 weeks. The short-term unemployed sample population was
4,646 (79.7 percent) and the long-term 1,181 (20.3 percent). Among
the long-term unemployed, 33.0 percent were unemployed for more
than 52 weeks, 37.7 percent for 27 to 40 weeks, 28.2 percent for 41
to 52 weeks, and 34.1 percent for 53 to 100 weeks. Among the short-
t e rm unemployed, 41.7 percent were unemployed for 1 to 5 weeks,
36.5 percent for 6 to 14 weeks, and 21.8 percent for 15 to 26 weeks. 
The data suggest that most unemployed individuals either find reem-
ployment or drop out of the labor force before 26 weeks, the point at
which benefits cease in most states. Nonetheless, over the last 25
years the average weekly duration of unemployment has incre a s e d
(see Figure 1).
L o n g - t e rm unemployment relative to total unemployment has
increased on average 55 percent from the 1949 to 1974 period to the
1975 to 1995 period (see Figure 2). The overall trend since 1969 has
been a rise in the percentage of long-term unemployed. Peaks
o c c u rred just after recessions and troughs just prior to or early in
recessions, but the average percentage rose during each economic
recovery period. Each peak was higher than the one before until the
peak following the 1990–91 recession. That peak was not as severe as
the peak following the back-to-back recessions in late 1979 and
1981–82, between which there was no trough. However, re c o v e ry
(that is, a drop in the percentage of long-term unemployed relative
to total unemployment) was slower after the recent peak than it had
Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Toward Greater Employment
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Figure 1 Average Duration of Unemployment
Note: Shaded areas represent recessions.
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (1996).
Making Unemployment Insurance Work
Figure 2 Long-Term Unemployed as a Percentage of Total Unemployed
Note: Shaded areas represent recessions. See Table A1 in the appendix for statistics.
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (1996).
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l o n g - t e rm unemployment percentage declined from a high of 23.9
percent in 1983 to 9.9 percent in 1989; during the economic expan-
sion of the 1990s the percentage fell from 20.6 percent in 1992 to
17.3 percent in 1995.
Duration of unemployment varies by occupation (see Table 1). Of
the unemployed workers in 1995 in the managerial and professional
specialty occupations, 20.6 percent were long-term unemployed; 17.1
p e rcent of all unemployed operators, fabricators, and laborers were
l o n g - t e rm unemployed. The higher percentage of long-term unem-
ployed in the managerial and professional specialty occupations can
in part be attributed to recent trends in corporate downsizing.
In constructing a profile of the unemployed population, it is useful to
know the age, educational level, marital status, gender, race, industry,
occupation, unemployment insurance status, and reason for unem-
ployment. Such data show that there are some significant differences
between the short- and long-term unemployed populations.
The long-term unemployed, on average, tend to be older than the
s h o rt - t e rm unemployed (see Table 2). More than half of the short -
term unemployed are in the 18 to 34 age cohort, and over half of the
long-term unemployed population fall into the cohorts that include
ages 25 to 44. More men than women are likely to be unemployed
both long term and short term, but the gap between men and women
is wider among the long-term unemployed. Short-term and long-term
Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Toward Greater Employment
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Table 1 Long-Term Unemployed Relative to Total Unemployed by
Occupation, 1995
Occupation Percent
Managerial and professional specialty 20.6
Technical, sales, and administrative support 16.6
Services 16.5
Precision, production, craft, and repair 18.1
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 17.1
Farming, forestry, and fisheries 13.2
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1996.
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ethnic groups. However, of the whites who are unemployed, more are
short-term unemployed, whereas of the unemployed blacks, more are
long-term unemployed.
Making Unemployment Insurance Work
Public Policy Brief 16











55– 64 5.4 10.2
65–72 0.8 1.3







American Indian, Aleut Eskimo 1.9 1.2




Never married 45.8 34.3
Divorced or separated 13.2 17.5
Widowed 1.5 1.8
Education Level
Less than twelfth grade 33.6 26.3
High school diploma 35.3 38.1
Some college 17.1 16.3
College degree 11.8 15.2
Graduate degree 2.3 4.8
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Survey: Annual Demographic File, 1993 (1993).
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Among the long-term unemployed, 46.5 percent are married, 34.3 per-
cent have never been married, 17.5 percent are divorced or separated,
and 1.8 percent are widowed; among the short - t e rm unemployed, 39.6
p e rcent are married, 45.8 percent have never been married, 13.2 per-
cent are divorced or separated, and 1.5 percent are widowed.
One explanation frequently given for the increasing duration of
unemployment is that there is a mismatch between the skills neces-
s a ry for existing jobs and the skills of the unemployed. If this is so
and if the mismatch is assumed to be inadequate skills for existing
jobs, to the extent that skills are measured by educational attain-
ment, the overall level of education would be expected to be lower
among the long-term unemployed than among the short-term unem-
ployed. The CPS data suggest the opposite. Among the long-term
unemployed, the percentage of those who have received a college or
higher degree was higher than among the short-term unemployed.
The older age and the higher educational level of the long-term
unemployed raise some questions. One might suspect that age dis-
crimination affects the willingness of employers to hire older individ-
uals, but how can the higher educational level of the long-term
unemployed be accounted for? The statistics on age and education
might lend support to the thesis of reservation wages as a factor in
duration of unemployment. One would expect that experience in the
labor force and high educational attainment would contribute to
higher reservation wages. Those with higher levels of education are
generally able to command higher wages. Those who are older with
more experience in the labor market have also become accustomed
to higher wage levels. These factors alone, however, may not be the
only source of higher reservation wages (to be discussed further).
General educational level and skill level are not necessarily the same.
Howell and Wo l ff (1991), for instance, have observed that corre l a t i o n s
between job-based skill and educational attainment are substantially
lower for nonsuperv i s o ry occupations (which they list as clerical, blue-
c o l l a r, and service occupations) than for superv i s o ry positions.
Educational attainment appears to be a better measure of job-skill
re q u i rements for professional, technical, and managerial occupations.
PPB No.26  2/17/99  4:27 PM  Page 17Occupation and industry have an impact on duration of unemploy-
ment (see Table 3). Over the last three decades there have been sig-
nificant declines in manufacturing occupations and industries (see
Table A3 in the appendix), precisely those that are relatively low-
skilled. Occupations and industries that have gained re q u i re gre a t e r
skill levels.
The higher percentages of short-term and long-term unemployed in
blue-collar manufacturing industries and occupations merely re f l e c t
the trends: the rise in manufacturing unemployment has been
accompanied by blue-collar manufacturing’s increasing share of both 
Making Unemployment Insurance Work
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Blue-collar service 4.8 5.5
Blue-collar manufacturing 29.4 35.8
Sales and trade 21.7 20.4
Professional specialty 8.6 8.6
Service 11.8 13.6
Finance, insurance, and real estate 3.1 2.9
Public administration 1.7 3.4
Agriculture 3.7 1.0




Blue-collar service 33.2 28.7
Blue-collar manufacturing 23.1 25.1
Technical, sales, administrative 
support, including clerical 19.7 23.2
Manager and professional specialty 8.9 14.2
Armed forces 0.5 1.0
Not in universe 14.7 7.8
–—— –——
100.0 100.0
Notes: Industry and occupation categories were aggregated by the author. See Table A2 in
the appendix for a description of the aggregation process. Total industry and occupation
percentages may not equal 100 because of rounding.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey:
Annual Demographic File, 1993 (1993).
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total long-term and total short - t e rm unemployment. Given the
decline in the nation’s industrial base, one would expect more long-
t e rm unemployment in manufacturing industries and occupations.
Although managerial, professional, and specialty occupations’ share
of short- and long-term unemployed is much less than blue-collar
manufacturing occupations’ share, managerial occupations’ share of
long-term unemployed is 5.3 percentage points higher than its share
of short - t e rm unemployed. Trends in corporate re s t ructuring in
recent years may partly account for this. It may also be that people in
these occupations have higher reservation wages and therefore take
longer to find or accept reemployment.
T h e re are significant diff e rences in reason for unemployment between
s h o rt - t e rm and long-term unemployed (see Table 4). Unemployment
is more likely to be involuntary among the long-term unemployed;
67.5 percent of the long-term unemployed lose their jobs involun-
t a r i l y, compared to 52.8 percent of the short - t e rm unemployed. This
d i ff e rence is critical in view of the fact that the principal criterion for
UI eligibility is that unemployment be involuntary. The other signifi-
cant diff e rence between the two groups is the number of people who
a re considered “other job losers.” Job losers who have become unem-
ployed for reasons other than business cycle fluctuations are more
likely to become permanently displaced and have no prospect of
being recalled to their old jobs. These statistics tend to correspond to
overall trends that involuntary job loss has become more perm a n e n t .




Reason for Unemployment (percent) (percent)
Job losers on layoff 16.3 6.8
Other job losers 36.5 60.7
Job leavers 10.6 8.5
Reentrants 22.0 16.2
New entrants 9.7 5.9
Not in universe 4.9 1.9
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey:
Annual Demographic File, 1993 (1993).
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Every few years the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) conducts a sur-
vey of workers it categorizes as displaced. The BLS defines displaced
workers as “persons 20 years and older who were released from jobs
because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insuffi-
cient work for them to do, or their position or shift was abolished”
( B u reau of Labor Statistics 1994). Others define displacement in
t e rms of prospects for reemployment. Layoff holds out the pro s p e c t
that workers will be recalled; displacement does not. By this defini-
tion, displacement due to plant or firm closure means that the job
will never return (Martin 1983). 
A c c o rding to the BLS survey of worker displacement in the early
1990s, about half of those who lost their full-time job during the period
f rom 1991 to 1993 were reemployed in a full-time job by Febru a ry
1994 and had earnings equal to or greater than those earned at their
lost job. Although 53 percent of those reemployed full-time reported
earning the same or more than they had at their lost job, workers in
transportation, public utilities, construction, and manufacturing were
more likely to find new jobs at substantially lower wage rates. Their
new compensation was likely to be 80 percent or less of their old
compensation. Many others in those industries were either employed
part-time, unemployed, or no longer in the labor force. The workers
with the highest rates of displacement were those who had held their
job for a relatively short time. People with less than three years of
t e n u re made up half of the total 9 million workers who were dis-
placed from 1991 to 1993, but they represent only about a third of all
workers. Among industries, the greatest number of displacements
o c c u rred in manufacturing, with 1.5 million factory workers being
displaced between 1991 and 1993.
According to Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993), the earnings
losses of displaced workers should be defined as the diff e re n c e
between workers’ actual earnings and what they would have received
if they had not been displaced. By this definition the displacement
effect on earnings is potentially larger than the earnings change from
immediately prior to separation. Their study found that the earnings
of workers who had held their job for a long time declined substan-
tially when they were separated.
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in income were exacerbated with displacement. Displaced workers in
the weakest local economies had earned approximately $500 less dur-
ing the quarter prior to job loss than those in the strongest local
economies. The gap increased 50 percent to approximately $750 per
q u a rter after displacement. More o v e r, the gap was found to re m a i n
the same into the fifth year following job loss. 
Job loss was associated with substantial earnings losses even in the
s t rongest labor market. For the period from 1980 to 1986 losses to
displaced workers averaged about $9,000 annually or 40 percent of
their predisplacement wages. Although these losses did decline
slightly over time, they never fully disappeared. During the fifth year
following separation, workers’ losses still averaged appro x i m a t e l y
$6,500 annually, or 25 percent of former earnings. “As a result, the
average present discounted value of the earnings losses during the
period from three years before separation to six years after separation
amounts to approximately $50,000” (Jacobson, Lalonde, and
Sullivan 1993).
A c c o rding to the BLS survey (1994), 61 percent of the displaced
workers received UI, and of those who received UI, slightly more
than 40 percent exhausted their benefits. The pro p o rtion of dis-
placed workers who exhausted their benefits was lower in the early
1990s than it was during the 1980s, when the U.S. economy was feel-
ing the effects of back-to-back recessions.
The primary cause of job loss for workers who were displaced between
January 1991 and December 1993 was plant or company closing or
move (see Table 5). The BLS survey results also reveal that a signifi-
cant number of workers were laid off because of insufficient work or
the abolition of the position or shift. If positions or shifts are abol-
ished because of insufficient work, these figures can be added to the
f i g u res for those who are laid off because of insufficient work. It is
assumed that these workers can expect to be recalled and will be
unemployed for a short period—which may serve as a compelling
a rgument for measures aimed at reducing the incidence of layoff s .
However, positions or shifts may also be abolished because of down-
sizing or technological change. Workers displaced for this reason are
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essentially no diff e rent from those displaced because the plant or
company closed or moved. These jobs are not going to re t u rn, and
these workers are likely to become long-term unemployed. They will
have to find work in the occupations and industries that re p l a c e
those that have closed or moved. Thus, the implications of position
or shift abolition point to a two-tiered policy approach, one that dis-
tinguishes between the short-term and the long-term unemployed.
Table 5 Reason for Job Loss                                             
Percentage of Total Job Loss
Plant or
Company Position
Closed Insufficient or Shift
Number or Moved Work Abolished
By Age
Total 4,473 42.3 29.9 27.7
20–24 years 153 45.5 36.3 18.2
25–54 years 3,540 41.4 30.5 28.1
55–64 years 611 47.2 25.4 27.4
Over 64 169 40.8 29.5 29.7
Men 2,614 40.9 33.0 26.1
20–24 years 77 43.7 42.2 14.1
25–54 years 2,097 40.7 32.8 26.4
55–64 years 383 42.9 31.0 26.0
Over 64 57 na na na
Women 1,859 44.3 25.6 30.1
20–24 years 76 47.4 30.2 22.4
25–54 years 1,443 42.3 27.1 30.6
55–64 years 228 54.4 16.2 29.8
Over 64 112 45.5 23.2 30.4
By Race
White 3,859 41.2 30.2 28.6
Men 2,291 40.2 33.1 26.6
Women 1,568 42.7 25.9 31.4
Black 427 51.4 25.3 23.3
Men 219 50.7 25.2 24.0
Women 209 52.1 25.3 22.6
Hispanic 361 49.2 35.5 15.4
Men 243 44.9 42.0 13.1
Women 118 58.0 21.8 20.2
S o u rc e : U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Worker Displacement
During the Early 1990s,” News Release, September 14, 1994.
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receive unemployment insurance. If Feldstein’s re s e rvation wage
t h e o ry applies—that is, if unemployment insurance prolongs peri-
ods of unemployment because it enables unemployed workers to
maintain a higher re s e rvation wage—it would have to follow that
unemployed workers are collecting unemployment insurance bene-
fits. This, however, is not borne out by the data. According to a
study by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Nichols and
S h a p i ro 1995), more than 40 percent of unemployed workers
received UI prior to the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1994 that figure
ranged from a low of 31.5 percent in 1987 and 1988 to a high of
51.1 percent in 1992. From May to December of 1994, only 32.5
p e rcent of unemployed individuals received UI in an average
month. At the same time, the number of long-term unemployed
i n c reased. 
The CPS 1993 annual demographic data showed an even lower fig-
u re than the BLS survey data for the percentage of unemployed
receiving UI. Only 23.2 percent were receiving UI among the short-
term unemployed and 43 percent among the long-term unemployed.
One would expect a higher percentage of the long-term unemployed
to receive UI because a higher percentage of them are involuntarily
unemployed. However, one would also expect a lower percentage of
the long-term unemployed to receive UI because they have passed
the point of benefit exhaustion; the percentage of long-term unem-
ployed receiving UI suggests that they are most likely re c e i v i n g
extended benefits. However, the question remains: If as many as 52
percent of the short-term unemployed are involuntarily unemployed,
why is the rate of UI recipiency less than half of that?
This question might be answered by looking at the proportion of job
losers to job leavers, new entrants, and reentrants. When new
entrants and reentrants are excluded from the sample, only 37.1 per-
cent of the short - t e rm involuntarily unemployed are receiving UI.
When the same categories are excluded, the percentage of long-term
unemployed covered by UI actually rises; 55.3 percent of the long-
term involuntarily unemployed are receiving UI. Because most states
restrict regular UI to no more than 26 weeks, the long-term unem-
ployed must be receiving extended benefits.
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National trends in long-term unemployment suggest the need for
unemployment insurance reform to create a system that offers greater
opportunity for individuals to match their skills with those demanded
by employers. Training would give the unemployed, part i c u l a r l y
those who have been displaced from declining industries and occupa-
tions, an opportunity to develop marketable skills. Receipt of extend-
ed benefits could be tied to participation in a training program. The
system would, in addition to providing basic insurance, become a way
station for individuals seeking to obtain the skills necessary to
become more marketable. 
The unemployed population is not homogeneous, and a reformed sys-
tem must recognize the difference between the short-term and long-
t e rm unemployed. Policy must be two-tiered to (1) reduce the
incidence of layoff and (2) help the long-term unemployed develop
skills that would make them marketable in today’s economy. 
The First Ti e r
The UI system could be tightened in such a way that it could dis-
courage layoffs. If no other re f o rms were made to the UI system and
it was maintained as a program of income maintenance, there is no
reason why the financing could not be re s t ru c t u red to reduce the
incentive to lay off. This would be the easiest re f o rm. In all other
countries that have UI systems, benefits are financed through flat-
rate payroll taxes or general tax revenues; there is no connection
between a firm ’s behavior and its tax liability (Topel 1990). In the
United States UI is financed through an experience-rated payro l l
tax. A firm that is more likely to lay off its workers pays higher
taxes. Experience ratings are premiums levied against an employer
on the basis of its history of layoff or the layoff patterns within its
i n d u s t ry. An imperfect experience rating of UI taxes, however, is
likely to encourage unemployment. Through UI benefits, layoff s
generate income for a firm ’s workers without a corresponding cost
for employers, thereby creating an incentive for employers to
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compensate workers with UI rather than earnings. Such a situation
may tend to increase the incidence and duration of temporary layoff
spells. The experience rating could be altered to make it more costly
for a firm to lay its workers off. If layoffs impose a higher cost on a
f i rm, it might consider altern a t i v e s .
A c c o rding to Topel (1990), a reduction in the minimum UI tax
rate to zero and a dramatic increase in the maximum rates would
have two effects. First, unemployment subsidies would be sharply
reduced, possibly resulting in a less severe distortion of the indus-
trial mix of employment and production. Second, the primary
s o u rce of wedge in layoff decisions (the tension between the bene-
fits of maintaining an experienced labor force, even during times of
low prod u c t i v i t y, and the immediate savings to be had by laying
workers off and rehiring them later) would be eliminated. Anderson
and Meyer (1993) noted that the “main source of incentives of lay-
o ffs on the margin appears to be that the tax rates rise too slowly as
benefit payments minus tax payments increase.” Even if large cor-
porations and multinational firms found it more cost efficient to
pay the higher taxes and continued to lay off workers, smaller firm s
might find it more difficult. 
Another way in which the incentive to lay off could be reduced is
t h rough some type of work sharing. For example, instead of laying
workers off, employers would reduce the number of hours their
employees work and the employees would become eligible for UI
benefits as partial compensation for the lost working hours; approxi-
mately 60 percent of lost wages would be covered by UI benefits.
Work sharing essentially seeks to avert layoffs by re d i s t r i b u t i n g
unemployment within a firm. It would be an important component
of UI reform in view of the fact that about 30 percent of the unem-
ployed lose their jobs because of insufficient work.
Work sharing has three sets of objectives. Its primary objectives are
to act as a countercyclical force in maintaining local, regional, and
industrial employment levels during periods of short - t e rm adverse
economic conditions and to cushion the effects of permanent labor
force reductions. Its second set of objectives involves helping firms. It
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costs associated with temporary layoff, particularly the cost of recruit-
ing and training new employees to replace those who would not
re t u rn after the layoff period. The third set of objectives involves
employees. It enables workers to maintain their skill level and work
motivation. It protects them from the greater dislocation and uncer-
tainty that would result from a layoff. It distributes the burden of
reduced employment activity and permits better income mainte-
nance for those who would otherwise be laid off.
Work sharing has been experimented with in Canada and California.
Available data suggest that these programs have prevented significant
amounts of job separation and that morale is higher than it would
have been with layoffs. Data from Canada suggest that 77 percent of
employees who would have been laid off without work sharing main-
tained attachment to their original employer. Another 5 percent had
been hired by a different firm shortly after the work-sharing period.
C a l i f o rnia data indicate that workers participating in work sharing
tended to be older than those collecting regular UI and to be
employed primarily in manufacturing. Surveys of employers, union
leaders, and employees in California indicate that fringe benefits
w e re fully maintained for more than thre e - q u a rters of part i c i p a t i n g
employees.
C a l i f o rnia employees seem to feel that work-sharing programs sup-
p o rt good relations among co-workers and work group solidarity.
They also considered the programs a fair way to deal with the unem-
ployment problem. Data suggest that productivity was higher for
most firms with a work-sharing program than it would have been if
those same firms had elected to lay off workers, but net productivity
was either neutral or negligibly higher for participating firms. Ninety-
three percent of California employers said that they would use work
sharing again (Best 1988).
Work sharing imposes additional burdens on firms compared to the
l a y o ff alternative. Using administrative data on all work-sharing UI
payments in the Canadian program, work sharing was estimated to
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D i rectorate 1993). According to Best (1988), major additional
administrative costs for employers arose from having to deal with
the UI system to gain approval for using work sharing and to arr a n g e
benefit payments. Employers also had to plan work reductions, des-
ignate participating employees, negotiate details with unions and
employee groups, adjust compensation and re c o rd systems, monitor
a ff i rmative action impacts, and make overall operational plans. A
s u rvey of 291 re p resentative firms in California using work-sharing
UI programs during 1978 and 1980 found that, given this added bur-
den, wage and salary costs were 2.1 percent higher than they would
have been with layoffs. 
Morand (1990) has suggested that work sharing could be key to
strengthening and sustaining the UI system during the next half cen-
t u ry. Though mindful of studies indicating higher cost than tradi-
tional UI, he argues that work sharing could be cheaper to administer
for workers, employers, and the system. It does not require job search
to be policed, and it keeps people out of employment agencies. It
does not lead to denials and appeals. It is the only labor market legis-
lation that is supported by corporations and unions and both ends of
the political spectrum. Work sharing may contribute to a more posi-
tive image of UI and may encourage and subsidize job preservation.
Because most workers are not fired, but are laid off, work sharing thus
encourages a rightful expectation that everyone willing to work will
continue to do so. 
It should be acknowledged that work sharing is not appropriate for all
employers. For companies that are closing or moving because of the
transitional nature of the economy, work sharing would be of little
use. It might even impede necessary labor market adjustment by giv-
ing both workers and employers incentive to remain in jobs or indus-
tries that do not have prospects for success. For this reason work
sharing could not be made compulsory. Rather, it should be imple-
mented on the basis of voluntary contracts. Firms could be induced
into entering into such a contract by being off e red a lower experi-
ence rating.
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The Second Ti e r
The choice of direction for policy re g a rding long-term unemploy-
ment will invariably hinge on assumptions about the motivation of
those who are unemployed. If it is assumed that the unemployed, par-
ticularly the long-term unemployed, could find work if only they
would adjust their re s e rvation wage to current market realities, a
solution would simply be reducing UI benefits so that workers had no
choice but to accept whatever jobs are available. One way to reduce
benefits is to tax them. On the other hand, if it is assumed that indi-
vidual spells of unemployment are longer today than they were in the
past because of technological and other structural changes, and if it is
assumed that the system should be designed to help workers find
a p p ropriate work at comparable wages, then the system must off e r
more than temporary relief and measures to get recipients off the UI
rolls as fast as possible.
Feldstein (1994) has argued that UI is a disincentive to work and,
therefore, if it cannot be eliminated altogether, it should be subject
to higher taxes so that the UI net replacement rate (the percent of
n o rmal wages after taxes that are replaced by UI benefits) is lower
than the current rate.2 Although UI benefits are subject to federal
taxation, they are not subject to Social Security and state and local
taxes. As a result, an individual could receive an amount equivalent
to a net replacement rate of more than 60 percent, even though the
UI gross replacement rate (the percent of normal wages before taxes
that is replaced by UI) may only be 50 percent. Making UI benefits
subject to more taxation will make unemployment less attractive
(Feldstein 1994). 
Solon (1985) found that after the introduction in 1978 of taxes on
UI benefits for higher-income claimants (those in families earn i n g
more than $20,000), there was a reduction in the mean duration of
UI from 10.8 weeks in 1978 to 8.4 weeks in 1979. But even if the
i n t roduction of benefit taxation can affect unemployment duration
and be an incentive to work, such an effect would not necessarily
make benefit taxation a good policy, because it would make UI less
e ffective in its objective of insuring job losers against income
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reductions (Solon 1985). He also argues that we cannot assume dura-
tion was reduced because of benefit taxation and not because of the
availability of more jobs commensurate with workers’ skill levels in
1979 than in 1978.
One problem with taxing UI benefits is the underlying assumption
that jobs exist. Cert a i n l y, if jobs do not exist, taxing benefits will
have little impact other than reducing the subsistence level of the
unemployed. Even if jobs exist, they may not be appropriate matches
between the skills of unemployed workers and the skills demanded by
employers. Any number of jobs will go unfilled because of skill
deficiencies. More o v e r, is there a social benefit to be derived fro m
forcing workers to take jobs for which they are clearly overqualified?
As a higher percentage of the long-term unemployed are in profes-
sional and specialty occupations, it must be assumed that their wages
would far exceed the benefits they receive from the UI system. Why
would these people prefer to be on UI at a fraction of their previous
wages? Is it possible that the jobs that exist do not require the skills,
experience, and credentials that they have to offer?
The idea that individuals have a reservation wage is clearly plausible;
the idea that UI necessarily inflates it is questionable. A serious chal-
lenge to the theory of reservation wages, or at least to the idea that
UI artificially inflates re s e rvation wages, is the large percentage of
short-term and long-term unemployed who do not receive UI. For UI
to boost re s e rvation wages, the unemployed would have to collect
benefits. If their re s e rvation wages are high in the absence of UI,
then other forces are clearly at work and taxing benefits would have
a questionable impact. More o v e r, the CPS demographic data indi-
cate that most of the long-term unemployed are older, white, married
males, presumed to be family heads and primary earners. It is difficult
to believe that there would be any incentive for them to remain on
UI at a fraction of their previous wages.
As Topel (1993) has pointed out, the principal factor behind rising
joblessness is that spells of nonemployment have become longer. In
contrast, the frequency of short spells of less than 15 weeks has
remained fairly constant. More o v e r, the  data  suggest  that
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unemployment and nonparticipation in the labor force are concen-
trated among persons with few currently marketable skills. An alter-
native to the interpretation of a lack of skills is that persons who are
doing poorly today have seen their skills become obsolete during
their period of idleness.
A UI system that could be of greatest assistance to the long-term
unemployed would not assume UI to be the source of unemployment.
It would continue to uphold the fundamental premise of the program
as it was originally designed—that unemployment is the result of
f o rces beyond the individual’s control. Instead of taxing benefits,
which is essentially punitive, the system should offer the unemployed
the opportunity to participate in training. Most people who are laid
off find reemployment within 27 weeks. If a considerable proportion
of those who do find reemployment either work in different occupa-
tions at reduced wages or work as contingent workers, then the sys-
tem is not helping them to find the appropriate match. If there is a
gap in terms of skills, the system might need to be reformed to help
workers develop marketable skills. The system can be reformed to do
more to help the unemployed find reemployment that best matches
their skills with those re q u i red by employers or to help the unem-
ployed obtain the skills necessary to find employment that will
enable them to maintain their standard of living.
The continued receipt of UI after 26 weeks could be made contin-
gent upon the willingness of the unemployed to engage in training.
By waiting until then to impose such a requirement, the system gives
the unemployed the opportunity to try to find work on their own.
The changing nature of not only the domestic economy but also the
global economy raises the question of whether an unemployment
insurance system can do more for displaced workers than simply pro-
viding them with income maintenance. Congress has sought to
a d d ress this issue by mandating through the Unemployment
Compensation Amendments of 1993 that new UI claimants, upon
filing, be profiled according to demographic characteristics and work
history. Those identified as most likely to exhaust regular UI are tar-
geted for job search assistance. Because the program has not been
fully implemented, it is too soon to measure its value.
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In the 1980s some dislocated workers received job search assistance
t h rough demonstration projects conducted in some states. They
found work from one-half week to four weeks quicker than those who
did not receive job search assistance. The average reduction in most
states was about one week. There was no negative effect on weekly
wages (U.S. Department of Labor 1995a); those who received assis-
tance found a new job at wages similar to the wages at their old job.
Early intervention efforts, such as these demonstration projects and
the 1993 amendments, offer some assistance to some of the UI popu-
lation; they represent a positive first step. However, reducing unem-
ployment by an average of one week does not address the problems of
the long-term unemployed.
There is a hodgepodge of federal government training programs tar-
geted toward diff e rent groups of people, but not specifically con-
nected to UI. In an eff o rt to remedy this disjointed appro a c h
C o n g ress is considering the Wo r k f o rce Development Act, which
would consolidate federal employment training programs and would
create a new funding process and structure. Although such consolida-
tion might be a helpful reform, the resulting training programs would
still remain separate and distinct from the UI system. The issue is
whether it is possible for the UI system to assist displaced workers in
obtaining reemployment early in their unemployment.
A worker profiling program would work in connection with UI to
identify workers who might become long-term unemployed. The
federal government started using such a program, the Wo r k e r
P rofiling and Reemployment Service System (U.S. Department of
Labor 1994), in conjunction with the 1983 amendments. An indi-
v i d u a l ’s first UI payment triggers the creation of a profile, which
includes information on recall status, union affiliation, education,
job tenure, change in employment in previous industries, change in
employment in previous occupations, and local unemployment rate.
On the basis of a statistical model, the individual would then be
assigned a probability of long-term unemployment. Individuals iden-
tified as likely to exhaust UI benefits would be re q u i red to engage in
a training program before the initial 26 weeks of benefits are over.
Training programs and services might vary from state to state, but all
would follow a general pattern .
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providers or placed in a selection pool from which a referral may later
be made. Services would begin with an orientation session advising
claimants on the availability and benefit of reemployment assess-
ment, and if appropriate, an individual assessment of the claimant’s
needs would be made. An individual service plan, viewed as a com-
pact between claimant and service provider, would be devised. The
claimant would be referred to reemployment services tailored to his
or her needs. Services generally include workshops on writing
resumes and interviewing and further assessment to identify other
needs so that the displaced worker can become more marketable.
Claimants would be required to participate in services to which they
are referred as a condition for further receipt of UI benefits. 
It seems that with the addition to the worker profiling system of a
serious training component, the UI system could be transformed fro m
an insurance system into a powerful mechanism for reemploying dislo-
cated workers. In the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance
Reemployment Demonstration Project (NJIRDP), which served as
the experimental basis for the larger profiling policy, three tre a t m e n t s
w e re employed: job search assistance (JSA) only, JSA and training or
relocation assistance, and JSA and cash bonuses for early re e m p l o y-
ment. Each treatment reduced the amount of UI benefits received in
the initial year and in subsequent years. Although a relatively small
number of claimants in the JSA and training or relocation tre a t m e n t
received on-the-job training, those who did had significantly higher
e a rnings than did the assessed JSA-only claimants in all quarters fol-
lowing the claim date. On-the-job training had a substantial and sta-
tistically significant impact on earnings and weeks worked thro u g h o u t
the six-year follow-up. Workers who received training earned $9,000
to $15,000 more per year than workers who received only job searc h
assistance and found reemployment 12 to 18 weeks earlier. 
Though it is not clear that retraining would assist all of the long-term
unemployed, there is reason to believe that it could benefit a signifi-
cant number. Almost two-thirds of the long-term unemployed have a
twelfth-grade education or less. Industries that are expected to grow
in the next decade will re q u i re a higher degree of skills than the 
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long-term unemployed workers have been displaced.
A c c o rding to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1993), the U.S. labor
force is expected to increase from 127 to 151 million between 1992
and 2005. Slightly more than 51 million are expected to enter the
labor force, with about 28 million replacing workers who leave due to
death, re t i rement, and other reasons. Almost all job growth is
expected to be in the service industries. Approximately a third of all
jobs created are expected to be in health, business, and social ser-
vices. The fastest growing occupations will be professional specialty,
managerial, and technical—those requiring the most education. The
fastest growing major occupational group requiring little education
will be service. The seven fastest-growing occupations are health and
computer related—positions requiring higher skill levels. Projections
of occupational growth are shown in Table A4 in the appendix.
These projections tend to re i n f o rce the current trend toward a “two-
t i e red economy”: low-skilled service occupations in the low-wage labor
market and high-skilled occupations in the high-wage labor market.
What clearly stands out, however, is that the fastest-growing occupa-
tions will demand a high level of skills from their workers.
T h e re has not been a great deal of experimentation in the United
States with alternative forms of UI compensation. Federal law allows
for the continued receipt of benefits in some cases if claimants are
e n rolled in state-approved programs. Existing information on the
e ffectiveness of training programs is mixed. The Job Tr a i n i n g
P a rtnership Act (JTPA), passed in 1982, provides job training and
job search services for disadvantaged and dislocated workers, but it
does not provide public service employment and cash stipends for
workers receiving training. As of 1988, JTPA was providing about
$200 million annually at the state and local level for workers perma-
nently displaced from their jobs, but funds are more generally used to
provide classroom training, on-the-job training, and job search assis-
tance (Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1995).
In 1992 JTPA enrolled 125,000 out-of-school youths ranging in age
f rom 16 to 21. Slightly more than half were high school dro p o u t s ,
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b a c k g rounds. The average length of time in the program was five
months, with an average cost of $2,800 per enrollee. Findings were
discouraging. The program, including classroom training, job search
assistance, or a mix of less intensive services, produced no statistical-
ly significant positive effects for out-of-school, male or female youths
over a two-and-a-half-year period. Moreover, there was no reductions
in either crime or welfare receipt among the participants (U.S.
Department of Labor 1995a).
The results from Job Corps, the most intensive federal training pro-
gram provided to any civilian population, are far more encouraging.
This residential program provides basic education, vocational skill
training, and a wide range of supportive services. Upon completion
of the program, job placement services are provided. As of 1993, Job
Corps was enrolling about 62,000 new youths and making approxi-
mately $570 million in total outlays. The full Job Corps training pro-
gram usually takes about a year to complete, but a “substantial
minority” (U.S. Department of Labor 1995a) drop out or are dis-
missed within the first three months because of the difficulty of train-
ing and the strict code of conduct enforced in Job Corps centers. Job
Corps participants tend to be even more disadvantaged than the out-
of-school youth in JTPA. More than 80 percent are high school
dropouts and three-quarters have never held a job.
During the four years after graduation, Job Corps enrollees earned an
average of $1,300 more per year and were employed over three weeks
more per year than members of a control group. More than 25 per-
cent of Job Corps enrollees received a high school diploma or a GED,
while only 5 percent of the control group did. By the end of the fol-
low-up period, enrollees were also twice as likely to attend college.
They required less government assistance, receiving on average two
fewer weeks of welfare benefits and one fewer week of UI each year.
Although Job Corps participation had no effect on the overall arrest
rate, it appeared to reduce the incidence of felony crime among par-
ticipants. Because of the intensive nature of the program, it had high
up-front costs, but the resulting benefits were estimated to substan-
tially exceed the costs. Lifetime benefits to society from Job Corps
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costs (U.S. Department of Labor 1995a).
In a review of diff e rent programs, the U.S. Department of Labor
(1995a) found short - t e rm training programs to be of little benefit
and long-term programs, lasting up to one year, to be more effective.
Moreover, those who enrolled in a community college program also
tended to do much better. 
Further lessons can be drawn from the Canadian experience. As part
of its UI Developmental Uses program, Canada experimented with
training programs and found some beneficial results (Park, Riddel,
and Power 1993). To study the effects of training, the program direc-
torate looked at six categories of workers: feepayer, job development,
job entry, skills shortages, disability insurance recipient (DIR), and
nontrainees (UI only).
Feepayer workers were individuals who were paying on their own for
training for approved courses restricted to designated skills short a g e s
and language training. To qualify, participants had to have been out of
school for more than two years. The courses had to meet at least 25
weeks, but could not exceed 52 weeks. Although participants paid for
the courses, they drew UI while enrolled. Job development workers
w e re long-term unemployed, defined as having been unemployed for
at least 24 weeks during the previous 30. Most were women. Job entry
workers were women reentering the workforce after an absence of at
least three years (job re e n t ry) or youths who were no longer re q u i re d
to attend school and had little labor market experience, defined as
having been out of school for a minimum of three years and having
been unemployed for at least 26 out of 52 weeks (job entry). Priority
was given to high school dropouts. Full-time courses could not be
longer than 52 weeks, and part-time courses could not be longer than
1,820 hours. The skills shortages program workers were those who
w e re “not job ready” and who did not meet the criteria for other pro-
grams, but counselors felt they could benefit from training. Tr a i n i n g
could last up to three years, but only participants with at least five
years in the labor force could train for more than a year. DIR workers
took training that did not interf e re with their job search (or they did
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UI). (See Table A5 in the appendix for a summary of program results.) 
Overall, the study found that participants in the feepayer and skills
shortages programs were no more likely to become reemployed than
UI-only claimants. DIR, job development, and job entry trainees
were generally less likely than UI-only claimants to obtain a job after
UI and/or training. Trainees, however, did re q u i re substantially less
time—11 to 17 weeks less, depending on the training program—than
UI-only claimants to find a job. A modest rise in the incidence of
welfare receipt was observed for job entry and job development par-
ticipants (Park, Riddel, and Power 1993).
Although training may be a short-term solution in that it helps work-
ers find jobs sooner, it is not clear that it offers higher income in the
long term. Those who receive no training, once reemployed, may
catch up. Beyond their high costs, the greatest problem with govern-
ment training programs is that administrators and program designers
assume that once workers have gone through a program, they will be
ready to work in new industries. Government training programs do
not necessarily take into account the skill demands of employers.
Assuming that the long-term unemployed would find reemployment
faster if they had the appropriate skills, encouraging the private sec-
tor to offer on-the-job training may be a partial remedy. Firms that
have specific skill requirements ought to be encouraged to hire and
train unemployed workers in a manner that meets the firms’ needs.
Funds that are currently used for extended benefits could be used as
tax credits or vouchers to finance such a program. By contributing to
financing in-house job training, a more perfect experience rating
would serve the dual purpose of helping to reduce the number of lay-
offs and assisting the long-term unemployed. 
The employment bonus program trials in Illinois are examples of a
type of bonus program that might help reemployment. In an effort to
encourage the unemployed to search more intensively for a job, the
state off e red workers $500 bonuses to be paid upon re e m p l o y m e n t .
Employee trials showed that workers who were offered a bonus found
reemployment faster than those who were not. Wo od b u ry and
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paid to 4,186 UI claimants), the state’s regular benefits paid to the
randomly selected treatment group decreased by an average of $158,
and the average number of weeks of insured unemployment
decreased by more than one week over the full benefit year compared
with the randomly selected control group. In other trials, bonuses
w e re off e red to firms to encourage them to hire workers. The
employer trials showed that workers found reemployment faster when
employers were off e red bonuses (Wo od b u ry and Spiegelman 1987).
UI might be linked to training through a bonus program mod e l e d
after those that offer payments to employers.
The data on these experiments are inconclusive. In a compre h e n s i v e
review of these experiments, Meyer (1995) suggested that cost-
benefit analyses indicate that bonus experiments usually lead to
small net losses for the UI program and do not produce any ultimate,
overall societal gains. For instance, an incentive to find a job more
quickly may induce a claimant to take a less desirable job. Although
results of the program trials did not reveal any adverse impact on
e a rnings, it is not clear whether these results would apply to a per-
manent program. Meyer cites three sources of this uncert a i n t y. First,
individuals who are encouraged to go back to work early may gain
employment at the expense of others who are unable to get jobs.
Second, with a permanent program a diff e rent fraction of eligible
claimants might apply for bonuses, thereby causing a change in the
costs of the bonus off e r. Third, reemployment bonuses make filing
for UI much more re w a rding, as claimants become eligible for a
l a rger payment if they file and find a job soon. 
A c c o rding to Meyer, the permanent adoption of a re e m p l o y m e n t
bonus could actually have the unintended effects of increasing the
number of short unemployment spells and the number of UI claimants.
Although bonus experiments show that economic incentives affect the
speed with which people leave the UI rolls, they do not necessarily
demonstrate the desirability of a permanent reemployment bonus pro-
gram. Simple cost-benefit analyses suggest that societal net benefits
may be positive only 50 percent of the time. Reemployment bonuses
make filing for UI more valuable since claimants become eligible for a
l a rge payment if they file for UI and soon after find a job. The
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unintended effects; it is not clear how such a bonus program would
impact the size of the claimant population.
Davidson and Wo od b u ry (1993) noted that because the bonus pro g r a m
makes it easier to fill vacancies, it might affect the job separation rate. It
could make firms more prone to terminate workers for cause and less
p rone to create conditions that would lower the probability of voluntary
quitting. Te rmination and voluntary quits create vacancies that are
costly to fill; because bonuses reduce these costs, those types of separa-
tion may rise as a result of the bonuses. Davidson and Wo od b u ry esti-
mated that the bonus program would not have a displacement effect on
workers who were eligible for UI but were not off e red bonuses, although
t h e re would be some displacement of workers who were not eligible for
UI. They found that the Illinois bonus program had virtually no eff e c t
on earnings of workers who were off e red a bonus.
An employer bonus program could be linked to training. The key dif-
f e rence from the Illinois model would be that instead of off e r i n g
bonuses to employers simply for hiring workers, money would be
offered to employers to invest in the development of human capital.
Since workers hired would not be receiving extended UI benefits,
those benefits would be used to finance vouchers for employers to
p rovide training or as a subsidy for wages paid to workers during
training. The program could be stru c t u red along the lines of a
voucher system in which vouchers would be off e red to employers
who would hire and train workers. 
Another option is to offer vouchers to the unemployed to pay for a
training program of their choice; they would be required to partici-
pate in order to receive extended benefits. Another possibility for
structuring such a program is to offer vouchers to employers who will
hire and train workers, and then use the extended benefits payments
to subsidize wages that workers receive from their new employers dur-
ing the training phase. This type of program presumes that once
these workers have been retrained for their new employers, their
employers would then pay them the prevailing market wage. The
idea bears some similarity to several welfare proposals that would
time limit benefits and then demand work.
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Because the unemployed population is not homogeneous, a two-
t i e red policy approach is essential. The first tier would seek to
tighten the system by adopting measures such as a more perfect expe-
rience rating and work sharing in order to reduce the incidence of
l a y o ff. The second tier would assist those who may be facing the
p rospect of long-term unemployment and need some additional
training or retraining.
UI reform should create a system that is flexible. Workers should be
able to choose the type of training they will engage in. It should also
provide motivation for the workers to engage in training. Tying the
receipt of extended benefits to a willingness to participate in training
is one means to accomplish this. The system would have to pay for
the training.
To be suitable to the needs of a changing economy, the UI system
must do more than merely provide income maintenance on the out-
dated assumption that jobs that are lost will simply re t u rn with
changes in the normal business cycle. The system has to re c o g n i z e
that unemployment is not the homogeneous condition it was
assumed to be. Increasingly, there is a distinction between the short-
t e rm unemployed and long-term unemployed, and the ranks of the
l o n g - t e rm unemployed are growing. Reform of UI should shift the
emphasis from temporary assistance in times of economic downturns
to greater efficiency in facilitating reemployment. Moreover, by seek-
ing a match between jobs and workers and appropriate replacement
wages for displaced workers, UI reform can enhance a core value of
American society: work.
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Table A1 Labor Force and Unemployment
C i v i l i a n L o n g - Te rm L o n g - Te rm
Labor Forc e U n e m p l o y e d U n e m p l o y e d U n e m p l o y m e n t U n e m p l o y m e n t
Ye a r ( t h o u s a n d s ) ( t h o u s a n d s ) ( t h o u s a n d s ) R a t e R a t e
1949 61,288 3,637 263 5.9 7.2
1950 62,206 3,288 357 5.2 10.9
1951 62,016 2,055 137 3.3 6.7
1952 62,133 1,883 84 3.0 4.5
1953 63,013 1,834 78 2.9 4.3
1954 63,642 3,532 317 5.5 9.0
1955 65,022 2,852 336 4.4 11.8
1956 66,549 2,750 232 4.1 8.4
1957 66,930 2,859 239 4.3 8.4
1958 67,638 4,602 667 6.8 14.5
1959 68,370 3,740 571 5.5 15.3
1960 69,630 3,852 454 5.5 11.8
1961 70,460 4,714 804 6.7 17.1
1962 70,613 3,911 585 5.5 15.0
1963 71,832 4,070 553 5.7 13.6
1964 73,091 3,786 482 5.2 12.7
1965 74,454 3,366 351 4.5 10.4
1966 75,770 2,875 239 3.8 8.3
1967 77,347 2,975 177 3.8 6.0
1968 78,737 2,817 156 3.6 5.5
1969 80,734 2,832 133 3.5 4.7
1970 82,771 4,093 235 4.9 5.7
1971 84,383 5,016 519 5.9 10.4
1972 87,035 4,882 566 5.6 11.6
1973 89,429 4,365 343 4.9 7.9
1974 91,950 5,156 381 5.6 7.4
1975 93,775 7,929 1,203 8.5 15.2
1976 96,158 7,406 1,348 7.7 18.2
1977 99,008 6,991 1,028 7.1 14.7
1978 102,250 6,202 648 6.1 10.5
1979 104,961 6,137 535 5.8 8.7
1980 106,940 7,637 820 7.1 10.7
1981 108,670 8,273 1,162 7.6 14.1
1982 110,204 10,678 1,776 9.7 16.6
1983 111,551 10,717 2,559 9.6 23.9
1984 113,544 8,539 1,634 7.5 19.1
1985 115,462 8,312 1,280 7.2 15.4
1986 117,834 8,237 1,187 7.0 14.4
1987 119,865 7,425 1,040 6.2 14.0
1988 121,669 6,701 809 5.5 12.1
1989 123,870 6,528 646 5.3 9.9
1990 124,788 6,874 695 5.5 10.1
1991 125,303 8,426 1,098 6.7 13.0
1992 126,982 9,384 1,930 7.4 20.6
1993 128,040 8,734 1,778 6.8 20.4
1994 131,056 7,996 1,623 6.1 20.3
1995 132,229 7,404 1,278 5.6 17.3
Source: Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President (1996).
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Table A2 Industry and Occupation Aggregations from 1993 CPS Data
See Table 3, Long-Te rm and Short - Te rm Unemployed by Industry and Occupation,
1993. The author aggregated industry and occupation categories because of the
small sample size of the data. The standard classification codes appear indented
under the author’s industry and occupation categories.
Industry
Blue-collar service









Professional and related services
Services
Business and repair services
Personal services, including private household services
Entertainment and recreation services
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Public administration
Agriculture




Transportation and material moving equipment occupations
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers
Private household occupations
Protective service occupations
Service occupations, except protective and household
Blue-collar manufacturing
Precision production, craft, and repair occupations
Machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors
Technical, sales, and administrative support
Technicians and related support occupations
Sales occupations
Administrative support occupations, including clerical
Managerial and professional specialty
Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations
Professional specialty occupations
Armed forces
Armed forces last job, currently unemployed
Not in universe
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Percentage of Total Employment (TE) and of Labor Force (LF)
1960 1970 1980 1990
TE LF TE LF TE LF TE LF
Occupation
Executive, Manager 8.4 7.8 8.3 7.7 10.4 9.6 12.3 11.3
Professional 11.2 10.3 14.8 13.7 12.3 11.3 14.2 13.2
Services 11.1 10.3 12.8 11.8 12.9 11.9 13.2 12.2
Technical, sales,
administrative support 21.6 20.0 25.1 23.2 13.1 12.0 15.5 14.3
Administrative support,
including clerical 17.3 15.9 16.3 15.0
Precision, production,
craft, and repair 13.5 12.5 13.9 12.8 12.9 11.9 11.3 10.5
Operators, fabricators,
and laborers 23.2 21.7 22.1 20.4 18.3 16.8 14.9 13.0
Farming, forestry, and
fisheries 6.1 5.7 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3
Not reported 4.9 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Industry
Professional and related
services 12.5 11.6 18.5 17.1 20.3 18.7 23.3 21.6
Services 8.5 7.8 7.7 7.1 8.4 7.7 9.4 8.7
Finance, insurance, and
real estate 4.2 3.9 5.0 4.6 6.0 5.6 6.9 6.4
Wholesale trade 3.4 3.2 4.1 3.8 4.3 4.0 4.4 4.1
Retail trade 14.8 13.7 16.0 14.8 16.1 14.8 16.8 15.6
Manufacturing 27.1 25.1 25.9 23.9 22.4 20.7 17.7 16.3
Construction 5.9 5.5 6.0 5.5 5.9 5.4 6.2 5.8
Transportation, 
communication, 
other public utilities 6.9 6.4 6.8 6.3 7.3 6.7 7.1 6.6
Mining 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.5
Agriculture, forestry,
and fisheries 6.7 6.2 3.7 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.5
Public administration 5.0 4.6 5.5 5.1 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.4
Not reported 4.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, United States Summary: General Social and Economic Characteristics, PC(1)-1C
1961, PC(1)-C1 1972, PC80-1-C1 1983, and 1990 CP-2-1 (1993).
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Employment Percent Change
2005 (thousands) 1992–2005
Occupation 1992 Low Moderate High Low Moderate High
All occupations 129,099 139,007 147,482 154,430 14.8 21.8 27.5
Fastest-growing occupations
Home health aids 347 794 827 835 128.7 138.1 140.6
Human service workers 189 429 445 451 127.6 135.9 139.2
Personal and home 
care aids 127 283 293 296 122.0 129.8 132.0
Computer engineers 
and scientists 211 409 447 485 93.9 111.9 129.2
Systems analysts 455 891 956 1,001 95.7 110.1 120.0
Physical and corrective 
therapy assistants 
and aids 61 113 118 119 84.6 92.7 95.1
Physical therapists 90 163 170 173 80.2 88.0 91.4
Paralegals 95 166 176 180 75.8 86.1 89.8 
Occupational therapy 
assistants and aids 12 20 21 21 70.5 78.1 80.1
Electronic pagination 
systems workers 18 29 32 33 65.1 77.9 84.0
Teachers, special 
education 358 594 625 648 65.9 74.4 81.0
Medical assistants 181 296 308 313 63.5 70.5 73.0
Detectives, except public 59 94 100 104 60.1 70.2 76.8
Correction officers 282 452  479 503 60.0 69.9 78.1
Child care workers 684 1,100 1,135 1,183 60.6 65.8 72.8
Travel agents 115 167 191 196 45.2 65.7 69.9
Radiologic technologists
and technicians 162 252  264 267 55.4 62.7 64.6
Nursery (farm) workers 72 110 116 123 53.1 62.0 71.3
Medical records 
technicians 76 118 123 125 54.4 61.5 63.6
Operations research 
analysts 45 67 72 75 50.1 61.4 68.0
Occupational therapists 40 61 64 65 52.9 59.6 62.5
Subway and 
streetcar operators 22 33 35 37 48.1 57.2 64.9
Legal secretaries 280 415 439 447 48.3 57.1 59.9
Teachers, preschool 
and kindergarten 434 646 669 682 48.9 54.3 57.2
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EEG technologists 6 9 10 10 46.6 53.8 55.4
Producers, directors, 
actors, and entert a i n e r s 129 190 198 205 47.0 53.5 58.7
Speech-language 
pathologists and 
audiologists 73 105 110 113 44.6 51.3 55.7
Flight attendants 93 121 140 144 30.3 51.0 55.5
Guards 803 1,138 1,211 1,255 41.7 50.8 56.2
Nuclear medicine
technologists 12 17 18 18 43.1 50.1 51.6
Insurance adjusters, exam-
iners, and investigators 147 205 220 220 39.3 49.1 49.5
Respiratory therapists 74 104 109 110 41.4 48.3 49.9
Psychologists 143 204 212 222 42.1 48.0 54.7
Fastest-declining occupations
Frame wirers, 
central office 11 2 3 3 –77.4 –75.3 –74.7
Signal or track switch 
maintainers 3 1 1 1 –76.6 –74.6 –72.9
Peripheral EDP 
equipment operators 30 11 12 12 –62.6 –60.2 –59.0
Directory assistance 
operators 27 12 13 14 –54.9 –50.6 –49.4
Central office operators 48 22 24 24 –54.7 –50.3 –49.1
Station installers and 
repairers, telephone 40 18 20 20 –54.7 –50.3 –49.1
Portable machine cutters 11 5 6 6 –48.3 –40.1 –39.4
Computer operators, except
peripheral equipment 266 151 161 168 –43.2 –40.1 –39.4
Shoe sewing machine 
operators and tenders 16 9 10 10 –46.3 –38.4 –35.8
Central office and PBX 
installers and repairers 70 41 45 46 –41.3 –35.6 –34.1
Child care workers, 
private household 350 220 227 242 –37.1 –35.1 –31.0
Job printers 15 9 10 10 –39.4 –35.0 –33.2
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machine operators 
and tenders 21 13 14 15 –37.0 –35.1 31.0
Cleaners and servants, 
private household 483 316 326 347 –34.6 –32.5 –28.2
Coil winders, tapers, and 
finishers 20 12 14 16 –41.2 –32.4 –22.1
Billing, posting, and 
calculating machine 
operators 93 62 66 68 –33.6 –29.5 –27.0
Sewing machine  
operators, garment 556 338 393 396 –39.1 –29.2 –28.7
Compositors and 
typesetters, precision 11 7 8 8 –30.7 –26.5 –23.3
Data entry keyers, 
composing 16 11 12 12 –31.7 –26.4 –23.8
Motion picture 
projectionists 9 7 7 7 –29.3 –25.8 –24.0
Telephone and cable 
TV line installers
and repairers 165 117 125 134 –29.4 –24.4 –18.7
Cutting and slicing 
machine setters 94 68 73 76 –28.1 –22.6 –19.5
Watchmakers 9 7 7 8 –26.5 –22.6 –18.4
Tire building machine 
operators 14 10 11 12 –29.4 –22.3 –19.0
Packaging and filling 
machine operators 
and tenders 319 232 248 257 –27.1 –22.3 –19.4
Head sawyers and 
sewing machine
operators and tenders 59 44 46 53 –25.7 –22.3 –10.3
Switchboard operators 239 177 188 194 –25.9 –21.3 –18.8
Farmers 1,088 831 857 914 –23.7 –21.2 –16.0
Machine forming 
operators and tenders,
metal and plastic 155 112 123 133 –27.8 –20.8 –14.3
Cement and gluing 
machine operators 
and tenders 35 26 28 30 –25.7 –20.2 –12.7
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1. For a more expansive summary of the literature review, see Oren M. Levin-
Waldman, R e f o rming Unemployment Insurance: To w a rd Greater Employment,
Working Paper No. 152, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard
College, December 1995.
2.  In the 1986 tax reforms all UI benefits became subject to federal taxation. It
is the responsibility of the recipient to pay these taxes; they are not withheld
from benefit payments. 
R e f e re n c e s
A d v i s o ry Council on Unemployment Compensation. 1995. U n e m p l o y m e n t
Insurance in the United States: Benefits, Financing, Coverage, A Report to the
P resident and Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Off i c e .
Anderson, Patricia M., and Bruce D. Meyer. 1993. “Unemployment Insurance in
the United States: Layoff Incentives and Cross Subsidies.” J o u rnal of Labor
Economics 11, no. 1, pt. 2: S70–S95.
Atkins, Anthony B., and John Micklewright. 1991. “Unemployment
Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review.” Journal of
Economic Literature 29 (December): 1679–1727.
Making Unemployment Insurance Work
Public Policy Brief 46
Table A5 Comparison of Canadian Experimental Training Programs
Disability
Job Job Skills Insurance
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